National Security Whistleblowers Coalition
FOR IMMEDIATE
RELEASE- September 5, 2006
Contact: Sibel Edmonds, National Security
Whistleblowers Coalition, sedmonds@nswbc.org
The 9/11 Commission: A Play on Nothing in Three Acts
By Sibel Edmonds & Bill Weaver
A wag once famously said that Samuel
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot was a
play where nothing happened . . . twice.
The two former co-chairmen of the 9-11 commission report, Thomas Kean
and Lee Hamilton, have released a new book, "Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9-11 Commission."
This book goes Beckett one better – it is the third act of
veneer over substance, self-aggrandizement over serious analysis, and cliché
over perspicacity. It is another
calculated attempt by the former commissioners to place themselves in the media
spotlight, and to overcome the humiliation of their widely criticized and
mostly debunked report. It is a vapid and substanceless attempt to claim moral
high ground and present the co-chairmen as heroes of honesty. It would be a farce, except that it has no
story line, save the aggrandizement of the authors. At least they are consistent in doing nothing and proclaiming
that to be a sign of their devotion to the country and the government. Beckett once said that “habit is the ballast
that chains the dog to its vomit,” and by this measure the chain restraining
Kean and Hamilton is a short one indeed.
As you
recall, Act One, “The Dirty Ten Digging on 9/11,” consisted of extraordinary
performances by every single member of the commission to convince us, the
audience -- the gullible public -- of commission independence, and its intent
to provide our nation with the truth, nothing but the whole truth; their pledge
to hold the ‘culprits’ accountable, no matter how high or low on the ladder of
the bureaucracy; their commitment to provide “meaningful fixes and remedies,”
regardless of any resistance they may have to face.
During
Act Two, the commissioners, led by their stars, Kean and Hamilton, put on the
performance of their lives. They
delivered a document that promised to be more than the mere sum of mortal
intelligence; they promised a report that drew on the nation’s soul and would
lay bare the necessity and nature of change.
Initially,
this play, scripted by the very powers the commission was to investigate, was
to have only two acts. However, due to
gradually increasing critiques by some in the media, even some of those who
originally attended the serenade chorus, and fairly loud boos from some of the
previously cheering audience, the producers have now decided to add additional
act(s). Act Three, the Finger-Pointing and Blame Game, stars Kean and Hamilton
as two comrades holding hands during the act and directing blame at the other
eight commission members, who are now cast as traitors and deceivers. The audience is led to assume that the other
eight members were responsible for the now untenable report; decided to pursue
practical failure but achieve popular success; traded the public welfare for
personal gain.
The Commission was created and put
in place due to the relentless pressure and outcry by the 9/11 family members
and their public supporters who had three objectives in mind: 1) Getting all
the facts; 2) Establishing Accountability for those who failed us due to their
intentional or unintentional acts; 3) Provide recommendation for real fixes and
meaningful remedies.
The Commission fulfilled none of
those three objectives. In their responsibility to report all the facts: They
either refused to interview all relevant experts and witnesses, or, they
censored the reports provided to them by those with direct and first-hand
information. Both these acts were selective and intentional. Contrary to their
pledge to establish accountability: They refused to hold anyone accountable and
lamely justified it by saying, “We don’t want to point a finger at anyone.” All those responsible individuals remained
in their positions or were even promoted. And as far as meaningful remedies and
reforms are concerned, the commission threw in senseless, and in some cases,
detrimental cosmetic and bureaucratic “solutions” that ended up making our
government even more cumbersome and unable to respond to threats to national
security. In the name of solutions and reforms, they forced down our throats
exactly what led to the failure to protect our nation on 9/11: A highly bureaucratic,
complicated, inefficient mammoth of a malfunctioning machine.
On the Fifth anniversary of the September Eleven Terror
Attacks, we, the National Security Whistleblowers, want to go on record one
more time to reiterate the significant issues and cases that were duly reported
to the 9/11 commission by those of us from the Intelligence, Aviation, and Law
Enforcement communities, but ended up being censored and omitted. The failure to address such serious and relevant
issues, witnesses, and information renders the report flawed and the
commissioners parties to a fraud on the nation.
The
following Veteran National Security experts were turned away, ignored, or
censored by the 9/11 Commission, even though they had direct and relevant
information related to the Commission’s investigation (for the PDF version Click
Here):
John M. Cole, Former Veteran Intelligence
Operations Specialist; FBI - Mr. Cole worked for 18 years in
the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division as an Intelligence Operations
specialist, and was in charge of FBI’s foreign intelligence investigations
covering India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Cole had knowledge of certain
activities that directly related to the terror attacks on September 11, 2001.
He notified the 9/11 Commission during its investigation, but never received a
response. His name and contact information was provided to the Commission as a
key witness by other witnesses, but he was never contacted or interviewed.
John Vincent, Retired Special Agent,
Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr. Vincent worked for the FBI for 27 1/2
years before retiring in 2002. He worked his last 8 years in
counterterrorism in the FBI’s Chicago Field Office. Mr. Vincent, along
with Robert Wright, exposed inefficiencies within the FBI in working
counterterrorism cases, and certain warnings they had tried to pursue prior to
the 9/11 attack that were directly related to Al-Qaeda’s financial network and
money laundering activities. Although he was granted an interview, the
commissioners’ investigators refused to let him provide them with information
related to his case and the 9/11 terrorists network; they insisted on limiting the interview to only administrative and irrelevant
questions and issues.
Robert Wright, Veteran Special Agent,
Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr. Wright is a veteran special agent in the FBI Chicago Field Office
Counterterrorism Unit. He had been investigating a suspected terrorist cell for
three years, when he was informed in January 2001 that the case was being
closed. Agent Wright, along with Mr. Vincent, exposed
inefficiencies within the FBI in working counterterrorism cases and certain
warnings they’d tried to pursue prior to the 9/11 attack that were directly
related to Al-Qaeda’s financial network and money laundering activities. Three
months before September 11, Wright wrote a stinging internal memo charging that
the FBI was not interested in thwarting a terrorist attack, but rather
"was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest when a
terrorist attack occurred." The FBI refused to allow Wright to testify
before the 9/11 Commission, however, the Commission did not insist or attempt
to subpoena Wright; despite the fact that it had subpoena power.
Sibel Edmonds, Former Language
Specialist; FBI -
Ms. Edmonds worked for the FBI’s Washington Field Office as a language
specialist with Top Secret Clearance performing translations for
counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations dealing with Turkey, Iran,
and Turkic speaking Central Asian countries. She contacted the 9/11 Commission
in May 2003 and requested a meeting to provide them with information directly
related to the terrorist attack. The Commission investigators refused to meet
with Edmonds and informed her that due to their limited resources and time they
were not going to interview all witnesses. She was able to provide the
commission with information and documents only after certain 9/11 family
members intervened directly. Ms. Edmonds’ testimony was completely censored by
the Commission.
Behrooz Sarshar, Former Language
Specialist; FBI -
Mr. Sarshar worked for the FBI’s Washington Field Office as a language specialist
with Top Secret Clearance performing
Farsi translations for counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations
dealing with Iran and Afghanistan. He had first-hand information of prior
specific warning obtained from a reliable informant in April 2001 on the
terrorist attacks of September 11. Mr. Sarshar contacted the Commission
directly but was refused. He was given an interview with the Commission
investigators only after 9/11 family members intervened directly. Mr. Sarshar’s
documented testimony was completely omitted from the commission’s final report,
despite his case being publicly confirmed by Director Mueller’s Office.
Mike German, Special Agent,
Counterterrorism; FBI - Mr. German served sixteen years as an
FBI Special Agent and is one of the rare
agents credited with actually having prevented acts of terrorism before it
became the FBI's number one priority.
He contacted the Commission in the spring of 2004, but did not
receive a response. In 2002 he reported gross
mismanagement in a post 9/11-counterterrorism investigation, which
included serious violations of FBI policy and federal law. Mr. German contacted
the 9/11 Commission during its investigation and requested that he be given an
interview session in order to provide them with certain domestic
counterterrorism investigations that he’d pursued. According to Mr. German
there were links between certain domestic and international counterterrorism
related to the September 11 attacks. The 9/11 Commissioners refused to
acknowledge his request and never interviewed him.
Gilbert Graham, Retired Special
Agent, Counterintelligence; FBI - Mr. Graham worked for the FBI’s Washington Field Office
Counterintelligence Division until 2002. In February 2004 his name and contact
information were provided to the Commission as a key witness with information
pertinent to the Commission’s investigation. The 9/11 Commission refused to
follow up and never contacted Mr. Graham.
Coleen Rowley, Retired Division
Counsel; FBI - In
May 2002, Coleen Rowley, as the Division Counsel at the FBI Minneapolis Office,
blew the whistle on the FBI’s failure to pursue Zacarias Moussaoui’s case prior
to 9/11, despite all attempts made by the Minneapolis division counterterrorism
agents. She reported
that FBI HQ personnel in Washington, D.C., had mishandled and neglected to take
action on information provided by her division. Despite her high-profile case the commission chose not
to interview Ms. Rowley. According to Ms. Rowley, no one from the FBI
Minneapolis Office (several Agents had direct information) was ever asked to
provide testimony, information, to the 9/11 Commission.
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer,
DIA - Colonel
Shaffer provided the Commission with detailed information on intelligence and
pre warning information obtained by his unit’s data mining project, Able
Danger. The 9/11 commission staff received not one
but two briefings on Able Danger from Mr. Shaffer and his former team members,
yet did not pursue the case, did not follow up on this documented report
and refused to subpoena the relevant files. Mr. Shaffer’s testimony, together
with other witnesses who corroborated his testimony and information, were
censored by the 9/11 Commissioners and never made it to its final report.
Dick Stoltz, Retired Special Agent;
ATF- Mr. Stoltz, a
veteran undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, had
played an important role in Operation
Diamondback between 1998 and 2001. The sting operation involved a group of
Middle Eastern men living in New Jersey who were caught on tape in an ATF
weapons sting conspiring to buy millions of dollars of weapons including
components for nuclear bombs. The case came to a screeching halt with the
arrest of only a handful of suspects in June of 2001 even though there was
ample evidence that some of the people who were attempting to buy these weapons
had connections with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden himself. The
9/11 Commission refused to contact Agent Stoltz despite all attempts made by
several witnesses from the intelligence & Law Enforcement Communities, and
the 9/11 Family group, Jersey Moms.
Bogdan Dzakovic, Former Red Team
Leader; FAA - Mr.
Dzakovic had worked for the Security Division of the Federal Aviation
Administration since 1987 as a Special Agent, as a Team Leader in the Federal
Air Marshals, and from 1995 until September 11, 2001 was a Team Leader of the
Red Team (terrorist team). Mr. Dzakovic had tried for several years prior to
the 9-11 attacks to improve aviation security in the face of the
ever-increasing terrorist threat. He provided the 9/11 Commission with his
testimony and documented reports. His testimony and report to the Commission
was completely omitted from the final report.
Linda Lewis, Retired
Emergency Programs Specialist; USDA - Ms. Lewis worked for 13
years evaluating and coordinating federal, state and local
preparedness for nuclear, radiological and chemical weapons emergencies. Prior
to September 11, 2001, she had reported numerous inadequacies and
dysfunctions in emergency preparedness, including a culture
of intimidation that discouraged federal evaluators from
reporting inadequacies in state and local plans and
preparedness. USDA officials had thwarted her efforts to
bring in terrorism experts to help the agency prepare for attacks on
federal buildings, including bio-weapons attacks such as the anthrax attacks of
2001. In vain, she had urged FEMA officials to develop a
national emergency communications plan and require interoperability of
federally funded emergency communications equipment. In the absence of
these preparations, New York City firefighters and police officers were
unable to communicate critical information on September 11 at the World Trade
Center. Ms. Lewis contacted the Commission and offered to provide
information regarding dysfunctional government preparedness, but
the Commission never responded.
Mark Burton, Senior Analyst; NSA – Mr. Burton served as
an all-source threat analyst in NSA’s Information Assurance Directorate (IAD)
for most of his 16-year career. He was
the editor of IAD’s premier threat document; the 300+ page ISSO Global Threat Summary, and was
an adjunct faculty member at NSA’s National Cryptologic School. He provided dozens of pages of
relevant information to the 9/11 Commission, but was completely ignored and
never asked to testify.
The above
list does not include many others from the intelligence and law enforcement
communities who had similarly contacted or reported to the commission but had
been either turned away or censored, and of course many others’ who are still
working within these agencies and are fearful of making their identities known,
due to the relentless pursuit of and retaliation against whistleblowers by
government agencies.
About National Security
Whistleblowers Coalition
National Security
Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), founded in August 2004, is an independent and
nonpartisan alliance of whistleblowers who have come forward to address our
nation’s security weaknesses; to inform authorities of security vulnerabilities
in our intelligence agencies, at nuclear power plants and weapon facilities, in
airports, and at our nation’s borders and ports; to uncover government waste,
fraud, abuse, and in some cases criminal conduct. The NSWBC is dedicated to aiding national security
whistleblowers through a variety of methods, including advocacy of governmental
and legal reform, educating the public concerning whistleblowing activity,
provision of comfort and fellowship to national security whistleblowers
suffering retaliation and other harms, and working with other public interest
organizations to affect goals defined in the NSWBC mission statement. For
more on NSWBC visit www.nswbc.org
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© Copyright 2006, National Security Whistleblowers Coalition. Information in this release may be freely
distributed and published provided that all such distributions make appropriate
attribution to the National Security Whistleblowers Coalition.