The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
United States House of Representatives
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2234 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
25 April 2006
Dear Chairman Hoekstra,
Over four months ago, on 16 December 2005, I wrote to you requesting to report to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) probable illegal conduct in the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I made this request under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA). My concern was that probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I informed you that these acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
When I finally met with your staff on 17 MAR ’06, last month, they believed that I fall into a “gray area” between intelligence and military special programs. They acknowledged, as NSA asserted in January 2006 (letter provided) that neither you, or any member of your committee, nor they on the HPSCI staff were cleared at a high enough security classification level to review the SAP programs and operations in question. Nonetheless, they did believe the intelligence committees should be cleared because intelligence personnel were so intimately involved. Your staff believed that someone in the House Armed Services Committee might be able to talk to me but were not sure whom. Your staff also told me that they were going to look into the matter in more depth and get back to me. They additionally mentioned that they were going to work with NSA and the Department of Defense to have some members and staff of the HPSCI cleared into the SAPs that I was involved in. Since that time I have not heard from your staff.
I have recently been researching the question of jurisdiction. In doing so, I have stumbled upon a directive that seems to address the question of who in congress is cleared to know about these SAP programs. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 (provided) states that the Senate and House Appropriations, Appropriations Defense Sub, and Armed Services Committees are responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs. No mention is specifically made in regard to the considerable intelligence missions associated with these SAPs.
With this Title 10 directive clearly addressing congressional oversight of SAPs, I have decided to make intelligence related inquires and requests that involve the SAP related ICWPA concern I need to report, to the aforementioned alternate committees. The very same request I made of you and the HPSCI over four months ago, I am now making to these alternate committees. They will be receiving letters from me in conjunction with this letter to you.
I still look forward to learning what you and your staff have determined as a result of the inquires spawned by our meeting last month. If you and any members or staff are granted permission from NSA to be read into the SAP programs that I was involved with, I am still willing to brief the HPSCI on my concerns of the intelligence missions surrounding these programs and operation.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The Honorable Pat Roberts
United States Senate
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
109 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-1605
25 April 2006
Dear Chairman Roberts,
Over four months ago, on 16 December 2005, I wrote to you requesting to report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) probable illegal conduct in the Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Special Access Programs (SAP)s. I made this request under the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA). My concern was that probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I informed you that these acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
To this date I have not received a response from you or the SSCI addressing my request to testify about these SAP programs. In a letter addressed to me by NSA on 09 Jan ‘06 (letter provided), of which NSA also provided you a copy, they asserted that neither you nor any senator on the SSCI retains high enough security clearances to hear about the intelligence work I performed in these very highly classified programs and operations. NSA’s assertion did not appear credible to me, considering I was an intelligence officer and the ICWPA suggests that the congressional intelligence committees are responsible for intelligence oversight.
The press has suggested that the Senate Armed Services Committee may be the proper place for me to testify about the SAP intelligence misconduct that I would like to report. Other rumors circulated that no one in congress is allowed access to this information. One news article said that the SSCI Vice Chair admitted that the intelligence committee did not have jurisdiction. In their letter, NSA did not make mention of any other congressional committee that was cleared. The staff of the HPSCI believes that I fall into a “gray” area between intelligence and military special programs.
As the responsible committee for intelligence in the Senate, I have been waiting for your directions on this matter. If another committee is the proper place for me to testify, I believe it is your responsibility to forward my request to that committee and keep me informed of the process. You are also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and, as such, should know if SAP related intelligence programs fall within the jurisdiction of intelligence and/or the military committees. If the SSCI is indeed the proper place for me to convey this intelligence related misconduct, I likewise believe it is your responsibility to inform me of such. This, of course, has not been the case.
In the absence of any direction, I recently have been researching this question of jurisdiction. In doing so, I have stumbled upon a directive that seems to address the question of who in congress is cleared to know about these SAP programs. U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005 (provided) states that the Senate and House Appropriations, Appropriations Defense Sub, and Armed Services Committees are responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs. No mention is specifically made in regard to the considerable intelligence missions associated with these SAPs.
Nonetheless, with this Title 10 directive clearly addressing congressional oversight of SAPs, and in the absence of any direction from the SSCI committee you chair, I have decided to direct all further intelligence related inquires and requests that involve the SAP related ICWPA concern I need to report, to the aforementioned alternate committees. The very same request I made of you and the SSCI over four months ago, I am now making to these alternate committees. They will be receiving letters from me in conjunction with this letter to you.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The
Honorable Jerry Lewis
United
States House of Representatives
Chairman,
Appropriations Committee
2112
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Lewis,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the
Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted
while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and
with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The Honorable David R. Obey
United
States House of Representatives
Ranking
Minority Member, Appropriations Committee
2314
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515
25 April 2006
Dear
Congressman Obey,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the
Appropriations Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted
while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and
with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The
Honorable C. W. Bill Young
United
States House of Representatives
Chairman,
Appropriations Committee’s,
Subcommittee on Defense
2407
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Young,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the
Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and
unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the
National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). These acts involve the Director
of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for
Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense is
responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The
Honorable John Murtha
United
States House of Representatives
Ranking
Minority Member, Appropriations Committee’s,
Subcommittee on Defense
2423
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515
25 April 2006
Dear
Congressman Murtha,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the
Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and
unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the
National Security Agency (NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). These acts involve the Director
of the National Security Agency, the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for
Air and Space Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense is
responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The
Honorable Duncan Hunter
United
States House of Representatives
Chairman,
Armed Services Committee
2265
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Hunter,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Armed
Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while
I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The
Honorable Ike Skelton
United
States House of Representatives
Ranking
Minority Member, Armed Services Committee
2206
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20515-2504
25 April 2006
Dear
Congressman Skelton,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I intend to report to the Armed
Services Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while
I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the U.S.
Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the House Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Dutch Ruppersberger
The
Honorable Thad Cochran
United
States Senate
Chairman,
Appropriations Committee
113
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Cochran,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations
Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an
intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United
States Senate
Ranking
Minority Member, Appropriations Committee &
Member,
Armed Services Committee
311
Hart Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510
25 April 2006
Dear
Senator Byrd,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations
Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an
intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable Ted Stevens
United
States Senate
Chairman,
Appropriations Committee’s,
Subcommittee on Defense
522
Hart Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Stevens,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations
Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts
conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency
(NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency,
the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and
the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense is
responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
United
States Senate
Ranking
Minority Member, Appropriations Committee’s,
Subcommittee on Defense
722
Hart Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510
25 April 2006
Dear
Senator Inouye,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Appropriations
Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts
conducted while I was an intelligence officer with the National Security Agency
(NSA) and with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency,
the U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and
the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense is
responsible for reviewing “waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable John Warner
United
States Senate
Chairman,
Armed Services Committee
225
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510
25 April 2006
Dear
Chairman Warner,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services
Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an
intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable Carl Levin
United
States Senate
Ranking
Minority Member, Armed Services Committee
269
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington,
D.C. 20510-2202
25 April 2006
Dear
Senator Levin,
Under
the provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act
(ICWPA) and in the absence of an official response from the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), I intend to report to the Armed Services
Committee probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts conducted while I was an
intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA) and with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
These acts involve the Director of the National Security Agency, the
U.S. Air Force Deputies Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, and the
U.S. Secretary of Defense.
These
probable unlawful and unconstitutional acts were conducted via very highly
sensitive intelligence programs and operations known as Special Access Programs
(SAP)s. I was a technical intelligence
specialist dealing almost exclusively with SAP programs and operations at both
NSA and DIA. U.S. Code, Title 10,
Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 2, Subsection 119 (Special Access Program: Congressional Oversight), dated 12 July 2005
states that the Senate Armed Services Committee is responsible for reviewing
“waved” SAP programs.
Due
to the highly sensitive nature of these programs and operations, I will require
assurances from your committee that the staffers and/or congressional members
to participate retain the proper security clearances, and also have the
appropriate SAP cleared facilities available for these discussions.
Please
inform me when you require my appearance on Capitol Hill to conduct these
discussions in relation to this ICWPA report.
Very Respectfully,
Russell D. Tice
Former Intelligence Officer,
National Security Agency
cc: The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes